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I. INTRODUCTION

Among the most vexing questions in the law of the religion clauses is
when a legal measure that might otherwise be justified as an accommodation to
free exercise is instead a forbidden establishment of religion. In a book about
free exercise, I have provided some idea just how complex this question can be.2
I now tackle it head on. Scholars have fairly observed that the Supreme Court
has given us no theory, or no tenable theory, for drawing the line between permissible accommodation and impermissible establishment. We will look at
what the Court has said and done, as well as the writings of some scholars, to
see whether we can discern bases in the Court's decisions for distinguishing
accommodation from establishment. (I also mention scholarly proposals that3
deviate more sharply from the Court's approach; those are analyzed elsewhere.)
This essay is drawn
CONSTITUTION, VOL. 2:

from a chapter

in KENT GREENAWALT,

NONESTABLISHMENT AND FAIRNESS

RELIGION AND THE

(Princeton Univ. Press) (forthcoming

Spring 2008) [hereinafter GREENAWALT, VOL. 2].
2

See KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION, VOL. 1: FREE EXERCISE AND

FAIRNESS (Princeton Univ. Press 2006) [hereinafter GREENAWALT, VOL. 1].
3
See GREENAWALT, VOL. 2, supra note 1, at Ch. 21; Kent Greenawalt, How Does "Equal
Liberty" Fare in Relation to Other Approaches to the Religion Clauses, 85 TEX. L. REv. 1217
(2007).
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It helps initially to set out some premises on which the remainder of this
essay rests and to note discrete subquestions. The premises are these: 1) A
great many accommodations to religion are exemptions from rules that are generally applicable, but accommodations may take the form of assistance that is
not an exemption, as exemplified by chaplains in the military and in prisons; 2)
Accommodations may be constitutionally required or within legislative (and
administrative) discretion. This essay concentrates on accommodations legislators choose to grant; 3) Whatever one thinks about the implications of its precise
language, the threefold Lemon test (a law is valid only if it has a secular purpose, does not have the primary effect of promoting or inhibiting religion, and
does not unduly entangle the government with religion) 4 has never been regarded by most justices as barring all accommodations to religion. Either they
have considered the purpose and effect of relieving burdens on religious exercise as one kind of secular purpose and effect (the majority position in Corporation of the PresidingBishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints
v. Amos) 5 or they have considered the purpose and effect as being a permissible
religious purpose and effect (Justice Sandra Day O'Connor's position in Amos 6).
Concerns about whether an accommodation is unconstitutional may be lessened
when it is formulated in general terms and not limited to religious claims; 7 but
the Court has never indicated that all accommodations made explicitly to religious exercise are invalid. Indeed, in 2005, the court unanimously sustained
federal legislation requiring accommodations to religious claims within prisons,8
and in 2006 it upheld the application of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
to protect the importation of an hallucinogenic tea for religious worship. 9 Given
that justices who reject the Lemon approach have joined these opinions, the
cases clearly indicate that the permissibility of some accommodations in terms
of religion does not depend on the continuing status of the Lemon test; 4) Accommodations may not involve favoritism of one religious group over another
similarly situated religious group; 5) Accommodations may not consist of conferrals of direct political authority upon religious groups; 1° 6) Efforts to aid or
promote religion that do not relieve any identifiable burden-sponsored oral
prayer in public schools is an example--do not count as accommodations. A
state may not single out religious groups for financial grants and call it accommodation; and 7) An "establishment" concern may be generated by flawed leg4

Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
5
Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v.
Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 336-37 (1987).
6
Id. at 348-49 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
7
As Chapter 21 of Free Exercise and Fairness recounts, typical privileges not to participate
in medical procedures are cast in this broader way.
8
Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005).
9
10

Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006).
See GREENAWALT, VOL. 2, supra note 1, at Chs. 13, 14.
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islative aspirations, by burdens imposed on those who bear the costs of accommodation, or by a failure to privilege non-religious claims analogous to the favored religious claims. Ifthe only problem is the failure to treat analogous
claims similarly, judicial correctives might take the form of extending the privileges." In other instances, the "accommodation" is treated as invalid.
Some of the crucial questions are these: 1) Must the burdens that accommodation relieves be ones that the government itself has imposed; 2) Are all
concerns about establishment removed if the classification for an exemption or
other benefit is in nonreligious terms; 3) What determines whether a classification may permissibly be in terms of religion; 4) May the state accommodate by
imposing burdens on private individuals and companies; and 5) Are the distinctions between permissible accommodations and impermissible promotions of
religion ones of qualitative difference or of degree, or of both? To put this last
question in terms of the Lemon test, will the main purpose or primary effect of a
permissible accommodation be fundamentally different from the main purpose
or primary effect of an impermissible establishment, or may the purposes or
effects be of a similar nature but of a different magnitude?
A helpful way to illustrate some of the premises and to illuminate the
questions is to focus on a Supreme Court case striking down an attempted accommodation.
II. THE PUZZLE OF ESTATE OF THORNTON V. CALDOR, INC. 12
In response to a court decision declaring that its Sunday-closing laws
were unconstitutionally vague, the Connecticut legislature allowed a greater
number of businesses to stay open on Sunday, and it provided that "No person
who states that a particular day of the week is observed as his Sabbath may be
required by his employer to work on such day."' 13 A Presbyterian who wanted
Sunday off sued after Caldor, Inc. refused to keep him in his management position if he refused to work on Sunday. The Connecticut Supreme Court ruled
that the law did not have a "clear secular purpose" and had a primary 4effect of
advancing religion because it conferred its benefit on a religious basis.'
On review, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision, with an opinion by
Chief Justice Warren E. Burger that relied on the law's impermissible effect.
By affording workers an absolute right not to work on their Sabbath, the law
took no account of the convenience of employers and of other workers. If a
business, such as a school, operated only five days a week, it would have to
grant an employee one of those days off if that was his Sabbath. And workers
I1 Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 357-58 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (nonreligious
conscientious objectors should be treated like the religious objectors Congress exempted from
military service).
12 Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985).
13 Id. at 706 (quoting CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-303e(b) (1985)).
14 Id. at 707-08 (quoting Caldor, Inc. v. Thornton, 464 A.2d 785, 793 (Conn. 1983)).
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with nonreligious reasons to have a day off would have to give way to those
with religions reasons. "This unyielding weighting in favor of Sabbath observers," went beyond an "incidental or remote effect"; "[t]he statute ' has
a primary
5
effect that impermissibly advances a particular religious practice."'
Justice O'Connor's two page concurrence seemed to go further than the
Court in various respects.' 6 By singling out "Sabbath observers for special and.
. absolute protection without according similar accommodation to ethical and
religious beliefs and practices of other private employees," the law conveyed a
message of "endorsement of a particular religious belief."' 7 According to
O'Connor, the accommodations contemplated by the Free Exercise Clause are
those that lift burdens imposed by the government, not by "private employers." 18 Nevertheless, she managed to approve the accommodation requirement
in Title VII. Title VII' 9 is the basic federal statute barring discrimination, requiring private employers to make reasonable accommodations to workers' religious needs (unless these would produce undue hardship for the employers).
Justice O'Connor wrote that Title VII is justified because it is an antidiscrimination law and "calls for reasonable rather than absolute accommodation .... ,,20
Justice O'Connor's opinion intimated two sweeping limits to permissible accommodation that are neither supported by the Court's jurisprudence nor
wise. The Connecticut law focused on Sabbath observance. Any specific legislative accommodation will be directed to some particular religious practice to
the omission of others, for example, use of peyote in worship, or riding motorcycles without helmets. If every choice to protect one form of religious exercise
is the endorsement or advancement of that form over others, every specific accommodation violates the Establishment Clause. 2' All that would be left for
legislators to decide would be whether or not to grant a general accommodation,
such as the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 22 that does not distinguish
among forms of religious exercise. Yet, it is highly desirable to leave some
decisions up to legislatures, not courts, as to whether state interests will allow
specific religious accommodations.2 3
15

Id. at 710.

Id. at 711-12 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Id. at 711 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
18
Id. at 712 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 83-83 (1985))
(emphasis in original).
19
42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2007)
20
Estate of Thornton, 472 U.S. at 712 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
21
One might defend such an approach as appropriate in the context of privileges of workers
vis-A-vis employers, but Justice O'Connor gives no such limited defense.
22
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2007).
23
See William K. Kelley, The Primacy of Political Actors in Accommodation of Religion, 22
U. HAW. L. REV. 403 (2000) (arguing that legislators are particularly to be trusted when they protect minority religions by accommodations).
16

17
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If the choice to protect religious exercise over other nonreligious ethical
beliefs and reasons inevitably advances religion in an impermissible manner,
then both specific and general accommodations are invalid when they are formulated in terms of religion. As we have seen, the Court has consistently assumed, with Justice O'Connor's vote, that some accommodations in terms of
religious exercise are all right.24
Chief Justice Burger's opinion for the Thornton Court was much more
circumspect. It eschewed the purpose argument adopted by the Connecticut
Supreme Court. One can see why. In any superficial sense-we shall later consider more complex arguments-it is hard to see that the legislative purpose to
protect Sabbath observance differs depending on whether it gives absolute protection or a qualified protection to be balanced against the economic needs of
25
employers and the claims of fellow workers. In treating Sherbert v. Verner
(which held that a Seventh Day Adventist could not be denied unemployment
compensation because her religious convictions precluded work on Saturday) as
continuing to be valid constitutional law, the recent Court has assumed that a
legislature might enact an exemption from Saturday work in its unemployment
laws to accommodate those who worship on Saturday and consider it a day of
rest. 26 The legislative purpose to protect workers from suffering conflicts between religious obligations (or needs) and the demands of employment does not
in any obvious way alter with the degree of protection.
Whether an effect is incidental or primary can reasonably be seen as related to the weight of the imposition on others. If religious exercise prevails
over all countervailing considerations, the advancement of religion is much
greater than if the law requires only modest efforts to accommodate. At least
subject to further analysis, Estate of Thornton seems to be a case in which degree is crucial. Effects of the same kind, i.e., benefits to religious exercise at
some inconvenience to employers and fellow workers,2 7 are primary or incidental depending on their magnitude. The case, thus, raises a flag of caution about
all efforts to distinguish permissible accommodations from impermissible establishments on the basis of qualitative (or categorical) differences.
24
I defend that approach in
supra note 2.

GREENAWALT, VOL. 2,

supra note 1, and

GREENAWALT, VOL. 1,

25

374 U.S. 398 (1963).

26

Sherbert, of course, was a decision about a constitutionally required exemption. But if an

exemption is required, it is obviously also one a legislature would be permitted to make. (And if
one thinks Sherbert survived the more limited free exercise rights of Employment Division v.
Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), only because the Court had previously decided a number of unemployment compensation cases, Smith clearly would allow legislatures to carve out the privilege
Sherbert requires.)
27 One might distinguish unemployment cases as ones in which the government (and taxpayers
in general) bear the burden, but in some states employer contributions to unemployment funds
depend to a degree on how many of their employees draw unemployment compensation. See
Kelley, supra note 23, at 414.
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Ill. REQUISITES FOR PERMISSIBLE ACCOMMODATIONS
Drawing from the Supreme Court's jurisprudence, we can identify the
following requirements for a permissible accommodation to religious practice.
A valid exercise in accommodation relieves a relevant burden on religious practice; its remedy is not intrinsically unconstitutional, does not impose unacceptably on others, and is not much more expansive than is needed; and its classification of beneficiaries is appropriate. We shall examine each of these requisites in
turn, asking how far decisions about whether they are satisfied can be based on
relatively straightforward classifications, demand nuanced judgments about how
to apply categories, or call for outright balancing of conflicting interests. This
examination is followed by an introduction to three scholarly proposals that
would significantly alter how courts address issues of accommodation. The first
two suggest simpler criteria, the last a large degree of deference to legislative
judgment.
A.

Relief of a Relevant Burden

According to modern Supreme Court doctrine, an accommodation of
free exercise must relieve a burden on religious practice, not promote or sponsor
that practice. But saying that an accommodation must relieve a burden does not
tell us what counts as a burden. Is any tax a burden or is a tax a burden only if it
really interferes with religious practice or falls with particular weight on religious practice? In Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, Justice William J. Brennan
wrote in his plurality opinion that an exemption for religious publications from a
state sales tax was not justified when (absent the exemption) the tax would fall
equally on all publications and apparently would not offend religious beliefs or
inhibit religious activity. 28 For Justice Antonin G. Scalia in dissent, it seemed
sufficient that the exemption relieved religious groups of a tax they would otherwise have to pay.29
Justice Brennan wrote that when a subsidy goes exclusively to religious
organizations and is not compelled by the Free Exercise Clause, it is invalid if it
"either burdens nonbeneficiaries markedly or cannot reasonably be seen as removing a significant state-imposed deterrent to the free exercise of religion...
,,30 The dissenters were much less demanding.
One might see this disagreement as over how great a burden on religion
must be or as whether relief of a burden should even be a requirement of permissible accommodation. Perhaps it should be enough that the government
enables religious practice without coercion or sponsorship. In Zorach v. Clauson, 31a case in which New York allowed public school students to leave school
28
29
30

31

489 U.S. 1, 18 (1989) (plurality opinion).
Id. at 38-39 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 15 (plurality opinion).
343 U.S. 306 (1952).
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specifically for religious instruction, Justice William 0. Douglas's opinion for
the Court is broadly positive about government accommodation to the religious
needs of citizens. If one thinks the case was correctly decided, 32 one might justify the result on the ground that mandatory school attendance did interfere with
possibilities for religious instruction (thus imposing a burden) or simply on the
ground that government may aid citizens who want to engage in religious practice, whether or not it responds to a burden.
In my judgment, the Court has been right to insist that an accommodation must relieve some burden on the exercise of religion; that requirement is a
needed corollary of a rule against promotion of religion. But this conclusion
alone does not settle the question of baselines. What exactly is the state of affairs against which the inquiry about burden should be put? In Zorach, is it a
burden that mandatory regular education occupies much of a student's day? In
respect to military chaplains, does one take as given the basic conditions of military life--or does one start with conditions of ordinary civilian life-in which
event military life restricts religious practice in a manner chaplains can relieve?
These issues about baselines need to be addressed individually. Some are easy
and some are hard, but none are resolved by a general formulation that requires
relief of a burden.33
One crucial question about burden is whether the burden must be stateimposed. The crucial passage from Justice Brennan's opinion in Texas Monthly
talks of a "state-imposed deterrent" to free exercise 34 and Justice O'Connor's
opinion in Estate of Thornton emphasized that free exercise accommodations
must lift burdens imposed by the government, not private employers.35 If this
limitation is conceived as applying to all government accommodations to the
exercise of religion, I believe it is misconceived. To begin, it is a strain to construe the accommodation required by Title VIH3 6 as only about discrimination, as
Justice O'Connor did.37 The statutory language demands that employers make
some accommodations to religious exercise that go beyond preventing discrimination. Justice O'Connor is on solid ground if all that she meant was that the
terms of the Free Exercise Clause, which bar laws "prohibiting" religious exer38
cise, seem to authorize only the lifting of burdens imposed by government.
(Although a state may "prohibit" the exercise of religion in a broad sense by
32

Since I believe that New York's law significantly promoted religious practice through the

use of the state's requirement that children attend school, I do not think the case was correctly
decided.
33
Many chapters in GREENAWALT, VOL. 2, supra note 1, address the problems of baselines in
specific contexts.
34
489 U.S. 1, 15 (plurality opinion).
35
472 U.S. 1, 11-12 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
36
42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2007).
37

See GREENAWALT, VOL 1, supra note 2, at Ch. 18.

Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion: An Update and a Response to the
Critics,60 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 685, 712 (1992).
38
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failing to correct a burden it has imposed, its failure to lift a privately imposed
burden does not seem to involve it in prohibiting free exercise.) Still, burdens
are often the consequence of an intermingling of government and private power.
Private practices are affected by various laws, and many private enterprises rely
heavily on government purchases and various forms of cooperation. And one
should conceive the authority of governments to promote public welfare as including some lifting of burdens on religious exercise that goes beyond the specific terms of the Free Exercise Clause. That is a much more sensible approach
to accommodation than treating every effort to lift privately imposed burdens as
invalid under the Establishment Clause. No Supreme Court case has actually
rejected an accommodation because it responds to a privately imposed burden,
and it is fair to say that question has yet to be carefully considered.39
B.

UnconstitutionalForms of Relief

An accommodation cannot remedy a burden by a measure that is intrinsically unconstitutional. Two illustrations will suffice here. In Board of Education of Kiryas Joel Village School District v. Grumet, the New York legislature
created a school district drawn on religious lines.40 That was regarded as
impermissibly assigning political authority to a religious group on the basis of
religion. 41 Another measure that would not be acceptable would be one that
required courts to use criteria of judgment that the Court has ruled out as themselves unconstitutional.4 2 A state legislature could not accommodate the religious practices of frustrated members of religious congregations by a law that
assigned church property to the faction that "has remained faithful to traditional
doctrines and practices." The Supreme Court has ruled that state courts cannot
create and use such standards,43 and they would be barred to state legislatures as
well.
Some forms of relief may not be intrinsically unconstitutional but will
have features that count negatively in an overall appraisal of their validity. The
government is to remain neutral as to religion, If it attempts to accommodate a
religious practice in a manner that encourages people to join religious groups
and to adopt or feign religious belief, that leans toward a form of establishment.

When an attempted accommodation raises Establishment Clause problems, perhaps the
countervailing free exercise interests should count more strongly if the lifted burden has been
imposed by the government, but relief from private burdens should not be ruled out.
40
512 U.S. 687 (1994).
41
Id. at 699 (Souter, J., concurring); id. at 722 (Kennedy, J., concurring). The two opinions
offer slightly different rationales, but the difference is not significant for this point.
42
The language of the Texas statute ruled unconstitutional in Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock,
489 U.S. 1, 5 (1979), seemed to demand difficult judgments about exclusion and inclusion, but
that feature did not figure in the decision.
43
See GREENAWALT, VOL. 1, supra note 2, at Ch. 16.
39

2007]

ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE LIMITS

Given the absolute privilege it provided, the Connecticut law held invalid in Estate of Thornton could well have encouraged people to join religious
groups that worship on the day they would want off. They could assume that
the state would not check their church attendance every week, and even if they
attended services regularly, that could leave much of the day for recreation.
Sometimes the need for accommodation is great enough, however, to warrant a
degree of unintended encouragement to join a religious group. No matter how a
draft exemption for conscientious objectors is formulated, i.e., whether or not it
is limited to religious objectors and does or does not require group membership,
it provides some encouragement to join pacifist religious groups, since those
deciding if an applicant is really opposed to participation in any44war are less
likely to determine that members of pacifist religions are insincere.
C.

Relation of Relief to Religious Need

If a legislative accommodation grants a benefit that is far more extensive than the burden to which it responds, the "accommodation" will become an
unconstitutional promotion of religion. This principle was invoked by the complaining fired workers in Corporationof the Presiding Bishop of the Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos.45 They claimed that the sensible
privilege granted to religious organizations to discriminate on religious grounds
when they employed persons in positions of religious leadership could not be
extended to mundane forms of work unconnected to religious practice. The
justices rejected their argument, on the ground that it would be burdensome for
religious groups to have to explain why they should be able to use religious criteria in hiring and firing for various positions, but in doing so, the Court accepted the basic idea that the breadth of privilege should correlate reasonably
with the breadth of the burden the privilege relieves.46
The Connecticut law reviewed in Estate of Thornton presented a problem of this kind, though not one on which the Court focused.47 The law gave
workers their Sabbath off from work whether or not they objected in principle to
working on their Sabbath, and could or could not combine worship and work on
the same day. 48 A large number of Christians have no objection based on their

44

This problem is discussed at length in GREENAWALT,

45

483 U.S. 327 (1987).

46

Such a correlation is also required if Congress acts to "enforce" the Free Exercise Clause

VOL. 1, supra note

2, at Ch. 4.

and the claim is that it has exceeded its jurisdictional authority. In City of Boerne v. Flores, the
Court held that Congress could not justify the breadth of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
as a measure to prevent actual violations of the Constitution. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
47

472 U.S. 703.

48

Id.
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religion to working Sunday afternoons and evenings. 49 Although the law's generosity in granting entire days off might be justified as a matter of administrative
convenience, giving Sabbath observers so much more of a privilege than most
of them needed could more reasonably be seen as excessive, amounting to promotion of Sabbath observance. We may generalize that the greater the law's
privilege in relation to the religious need to which it responds, the more likely it
will be that the legislature has gone beyond relieving a burden.
D.

PermissibleClassification

A legislative accommodation must classify beneficiaries in an acceptable way. Most obviously, the legislature cannot treat similarly situated religious groups differently. 50 A particular problem raised by the Kiryas Joel case
is whether a legislature may respond with focused legislation to a particular
problem faced by one religious group, given the absence of any assurance that it
would treat another group similarly in the future.5 1 Justice David H. Souter
wrote for the Court that this potential for discrimination constituted an unacceptable failure to exercise authority in a religiously neutral way. 52 With Justice
Anthony M. Kennedy,53 I believe to the contrary that legislatures should be able
to respond to pressing needs for accommodation; if unfair differentiation later
occurs, judges can respond to it.
The more pervasive question about accommodation classification is
whether religious groups and practices may be treated differently from analogous nonreligious ones. The most sensible position, I have claimed, is that for
some subjects religion may be treated differently, for others not.
If a legislature's initial classification is impermissible for one reason or
another, the legislature can choose to withdraw the benefit altogether or to extend the range of beneficiaries. Unless and until the legislature acts, a court
declaring a classification invalid must make a similar choice, based, it is often
said, on its best judgment of what the legislature would want. 54 Much may depend on the size of the pool the legislature intended to benefit in relation to the
size of the pool needed to make a classification constitutional. If the intended
religious beneficiaries numbered 100,000 and the nonreligious pool needed to
make the classification acceptable numbered 3,000, one would assume the legisOne might think this superfluous degree of privilege was partly designed to give Christians
no less of a privilege than Jews, who, if observant, do not believe they should work on their Sabbath.
50
I consider what features might make groups sufficiently dissimilar to make differential
treatment acceptable in GREENAWALT, VOL. 2, supra note 1, and GREENAWALT, VOL. 1, supra note
2.
51
Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (2004).
52
Id. at 703.
53
Id. at 726-27 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
54
Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 357-58 (Harlan, J., concurring).
49
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lature would want an extension. Were the numbers reversed, one would think
the legislature would prefer to withdraw the benefit.
If a legislature chooses to grant a benefit in a way that is not limited to
religious claimants, the chances are significantly reduced that a court will find a
violation of the Establishment Clause, even if the main body of intended beneficiaries have religious reasons to want the benefit. One option is to make the
benefit available to anyone who wishes to take advantage of it. A prison concerned about religious objections of inmates to eating meat (or specific kinds of
meat) may provide a vegetarian option, allowing any prisoner to choose the
vegetarian meal. Concerned about religious scruples against oaths, the drafters
of the Federal Constitution itself allowed federal
officials to be bound to support
55
the Constitution "by Oath or Affirmation.
Rather than granting a benefit to all who wish it, a legislature may set
criteria that do not refer to religion.56 It may, for example, allow nurses not to
participate in medical procedures if they have a moral objection or an objection
in conscience to doing so. Or, parents may be excused from having their children vaccinated if vaccinations are contrary to their moral convictions. These
criteria include religious convictions, but do not privilege them.
Although uses of these broader criteria sharply reduce concerns about
violations of the Establishment Clause, they do not necessarily eliminate them.
That is most evident with respect to constitutional objections that rest on the
burdens that must be borne by others. Suppose the Connecticut law in Estate of
Thornton had mandated a day off for all workers who had a reason of conscience not to work on that day. If an employer could show to the satisfaction
of a court that the overarching aim and effect of the law was to protect Sabbath
observance, it could presumably succeed on the argument that did succeed in the
case-namely, that the legislature cannot protect the religious exercise of some
citizens by imposing unduly on the interests of other citizens.5 7 It is to this subject that we now turn.
E.

Who Bears the Burden of a Privilege and How Great is the Burden's
Weight?

An accommodation relieves a burden on the religious exercise of certain
individuals; sometimes, but not always, others have to bear the cost of the privilege that the accommodation grants. That can make a crucial difference for
whether the accommodation is constitutional. In any realistic sense, some accommodations carry no burden to be borne by others. If officials or witnesses at
VI.

55

U.S. CONST., art.

56

A variation on this option is to include religion explicitly as a basis, but also to include other

bases that reach all analogous reasons for wanting to behave in a particular way.
A similar analysis may be made of claims of hospitals and patients that a privilege for
nurses not to participate may interfere too greatly with the provision of medical benefits. See the
discussion in GREENAWALT, VOL. 1,supra note 2, at Ch. 21.
57
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trial can "affirm" rather than swearing an oath, no one is poorer (unless those
who affirm are more likely to lie as a consequence). If members of the Native
American Church can ingest peyote in worship services, no one else suffers as a
result. 58
Other privileges from accommodations do impose disadvantages on
others. The cost may be a financial one for the government and thus for individuals as taxpayers. In Texas Monthly, Justice Brennan wrote that the exemption from the sales tax for religious publications "burdens nonbeneficiaries by
increasing their tax bills by whatever amount is needed to offset the benefit bestowed on subscribers to religious publications., 59 Although such a cost may be
of some concern, an otherwise valid accommodation would not be ruled unconstitutional because taxpayers have to foot the bill.
The real problems arise if the cost is borne by private persons and enterprises in a way that reaches beyond a marginal increase in their tax liabilities.
These costs can be financial or in opportunities foregone; they can be in terms
of religious exercise itself. In Estate of Thornton, either employers had to carry

the costs of workers taking their Sabbath off, or other workers had to work on
days they would have preferred to be home (mainly Sunday and Saturday), or
both.60 For the Court, the demands that Connecticut's absolute Sabbath privilege placed on employers and other workers were too great.
As I have suggested in my original account of the case, it is hard to understand the question of whether the burdens to be borne by others are too great
as anything other than a matter of degree. A slight cost borne by private individuals will not violate the Establishment Clause, a heavy cost will amount to an
advancement of religion at the expense of other interests. Jonathan E. Nuechterlein has suggested, however, that the case may be analyzed in terms of an inquiry about purpose. 6 ' The legislature's extreme inattention to the interests of
employers and other workers demonstrated that its purpose was to promote religion rather than lift a burden.62 Although it is true that a failure to consider the
That is, assuming that those who have ingested peyote do not go out and harm others, and
putting aside feelings of possible discrimination among those who have nonreligious reasons to
ingest peyote.
59
489 U.S. at 19 n.8 (plurality opinion).
60
In Estate of Thornton, 472 U.S. 703 (1985), the original burden on free exercise came from
employers who wanted employees to work on Sunday (and other days that were the Sabbaths of
workers) and the cost of the countervailing privilege not to work on one's Sabbath also fell on
employers. These two features, source of burden and cost of its relief, typically combine but they
are distinctive. If the government gives an absolute Sabbath privilege to its own workers, the
burden may fall mainly on other individual government workers, not the government and taxpayers in general. If the government gives special compensation to those who lose jobs in the private
sector because they refuse to work on their Sabbath, the burden would be privately created but the
expense of accommodation would fall on the government and its taxpayers.
61
Jonathan E. Nuechterlein, The Free Exercise Boundaries of Permissible Accommodation
Under the Establishment Clause, 99 YALE L. J. 1127, 1141-43 (1990).
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interests of others can often be a signal of one's purpose, I am skeptical about
this particular conclusion. Why should we not rather say that the legislators
regarded an inability to worship on the Sabbath as a very heavy burden that
needed to be lifted however high the cost on others? 63 In any event, if one standard for whether the legislative purpose was to promote religion is assessing the
magnitude of hardship others must bear, we are still left to consider the degree
of that hardship, to determine purpose. 64
A special kind of burden that others might bear is an imposition on their
own religious freedom. Michael McConnell has written, "An accommodation
must not interfere with the religious liberty of others by forcing them to participate in religious observance., 65 McConnell is right to note the difference between an indirect economic injury and some form of forced participation in religious exercise. The latter will almost never be constitutionally allowable, but
we cannot rule out completely the possibility that a law may pressure individuals to a degree to participate in a proceeding that has some religious significance
but also gravely affects the value of civic rights of someone else. For example,
the law may impose certain negative consequences on divorcing husbands of the
before a beth din, in proceedings leading to a
Jewish faith who refuse to appear
66
religious divorce for their wives.
A particular problem about bearing the burden of accommodation arises
when a law accommodates by giving a private enterprise the right to treat someone (a worker) differently from how it could treat that person if ordinary prohibitions applied. In Amos, 67 the Mormon gymnasium was allowed to fire a
worker on religious grounds. Justice Byron R. White's opinion for the majority
suggested that if all the law does is to give a religious organization a privilege to
engage in discrimination, if it chooses, the discrimination is not the responsibility of the government. 68 On that view, the burden on the workers' free exercise
of religion, namely that a deviation from Mormon practice might lose them their
jobs, was not attributable to the government. The better view, that taken by the
concurring justices, was that the interference with workers' religious exercise,
63

The fact that the law gave workers their Sabbath off from work whether or not they objected

in principle to working on their Sabbath, and had religious reasons not to work on their Sabbath,
was a stronger signal of a purpose to promote Sabbath worship than the burden placed on employers.
64
If the conclusion about purpose is, instead, simply a label one affixes once one has decided
that a burden is disproportionate, then purpose itself plays no real part in the analysis at all.
I mean here to distinguish between assuming that legislators (or a reasonable legislator)
actually had in mind one objective or another, with degree of burden providing some evidence of
actual intent, from treating the "purpose" as depending directly on the degree of burden apart from
any assumption about people's actual objectives.
65
Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 SuP. CT. REv. 1, 37.
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authorized by the law, did need to be taken into account, but that it was justified
in terms of6 9the free exercise interests supporting freedom for the religious organization.
F.

A Brief Word about Major Alternatives

Elsewhere,7 ° I review two notable proposals, "substantive neutrality '71
and "equal regard, 72 that draw on aspects of what the Supreme Court has decided but would reform the law of the religion clauses to a considerable extent.
Either of these proposals, if adopted, would affect how one would draw the line
between permissible accommodation and impermissible establishment. Instead
of working through separate inquiries about burdens, purposes, and effects, a
court would ask how the law fares against an ideal of neutrality or equal regard.
Under an ideal of neutrality, the government would aim to the greatest extent
possible neither to encourage nor discourage religious affiliation and practice.
Under an ideal of equal regard it would aim to respect religious claims equally
with nonreligious claims. Because the Connecticut law in Estate of Thornton
could easily have encouraged people to join churches and gave unequal regard
to religious and nonreligious claims to be free of Sunday work, we can see how
either of these approaches might have yielded the result of that case.
Two points about "neutrality" and "equal regard" approaches are important here. First, the apparent simplicity of each approach might lead one to
think that they would permit straightforward categorical analysis, rather than
balancing and assessing matters of degree, but I try to show how far that is from
the truth. Second, even if one believes that neither approach captures all that is
relevant under the religion clauses-and I argue that neither does-the considerations they pick out as crucial are relevant in an overall appraisal of what constitute relevant burdens and acceptable effects.
G.

Deference to Legislative Judgment

As with most individual rights questions, the Supreme Court has approached the bulk of religion clause cases without affording great deference to
legislative judgment. William Kelley has urged that this approach is misconceived as far as accommodations are concerned because these typically assist
minority groups and legislatures can be trusted when they reach out to protect

69
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See the discussion at GREENAWALT, VOL. 1, supra note 2, at 383-84.
See GREENAWALT, VOL. 2, supra note 1, at Ch. 21.
Douglas Laycock, Formal,Substantive, and DisaggregatedNeutrality Toward Religion, 39
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minorities.73 Insofar as it is sound, this argument would apply when legislatures
choose to protect minorities, not when they refuse to do so. Two problems with
the argument concern its level of generality. Major pieces of accommodation
legislation, such as the federal and state RFRAs, and RLUPA74 have been
strongly supported by leading religious groups. Legislators may be disinclined
to oppose that powerful set of lobbyists. 75 And legislators who may be trusted
not to exaggerate the needs of minority religions over the welfare of the general
populace may not care very much about the small number of nonreligious people with claims analogous to religious ones, such as nonreligious objectors to
vaccinations. As to the choice whether to include nonreligious claimants in an
exemption that will mainly benefit religious individuals, we have little reason to
trust legislative majorities.
A quite different approach to accommodation from one of deference is
skepticism about any legislative accommodation. According to the view that
sees accommodations as benefits for religion that are a kind of trade-off for
various disabilities required by the Establishment Clause, when disabilities
shrink (as they have in recent years), permissible accommodations should also
shrink to keep matters in balance. I do not think special protections for religious
exercise are mainly a question of offsetting disadvantages required by the Establishment Clause.7 6 Rather, the protection of religious liberty is independently
valuable. Thus, I do not believe, and the Court has never suggested, that the
range of permissible accommodation should expand or contract with expansions
and contractions in Establishment Clause limits.
H.

Summary

In drawing the line between permitted accommodation and forbidden
establishment, courts must engage a number of inquiries. Sometimes their
analysis can be categorical, whether a law is of one kind or another, but often
they must assess subtle nuances and matters of degree to determine whether the
border between the constitutional and the unconstitutional has been crossed.
-fin-
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